Although T4 might not be viable, we might still be able to obscure some information from Big Brother by requiring that complete agreements (but not partial agreements) have precisely the maximum number of public keys in the chain. That way, any instances that are owned or compromised by Big Brother, and that receive the complete agreement for a transaction, will have a harder time figuring out how many instances were involved in the transaction, and therefore who was involved in the transaction.
- R1:b116cc190bbf: Adjust non-execution commitment description for new "nontrivial"
R1:f613f4cba6d5: Redefine trivial complete agreement
R1:ffdeb2316026: Avoid "nontrivial" for paths executing a transaction
R1:753f9ed60cb3: Complete agreements don't need a separate length indicator
R1:176dfc796cb7: Initiator's key can only be reused as the last possible key in path
R1:63e330d9914a: Transaction identifiers determine the lengths of complete agreements
R1:bac6c38bfebc: Talk about nontrivial paths, rather than complete agreements
|Open||None||T1 Cheap, private payments via a decentralized network|
|Open||tim||T2 Finalize a first draft of a specification for a decentralized payments protocol|
|Open||tim||T12 Revise introduction to the specification|
|Resolved||tim||T5 Finish Messages section of the specification|
|Resolved||tim||T41 Require complete agreements to be full|